

From Modernization Theory to Human Rights - The impact of international cooperation and academic outreach in the social sciences¹

Simon Schwartzman²

Instituto de Estudos do Trabalho e Sociedade - IETS

Introduction

One of the most important activities of leading universities is international outreach, through which they expand and disseminate the central values of knowledge creation, advanced education and the use of science and technology for social wellbeing and economic development. These activities are seen and presented as part of the universities' broader role as knowledge centers and innovation drivers, directed not only to the societies where they are located, but also to other countries and regions in need. They may be seen and presented also in a more selfish perspective, as responding to their own needs to increase their influence and sources of support in a globalized world; or a combination of both. As universities link out, they create what has been called "epistemic communities", groups of people in different parts of the world sharing similar knowledge and values, who can act as bridges between countries and may shape and influence the way their societies and institutions evolve (Knorr-Cetina 1999).

In this essay, we look at the way academic international outreach has changed in the last decades, with special attention to the links between the leading US

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² simon@iets.org.br

universities and universities in the developing world, and more particularly in Latin America. Our goal is to look at these relationships, with a special emphasis on the shifting conceptions and ideas about their purpose and impact. This is a vast and very complex subject, and we will deal with them by using some cases and experiences, based on the existing literature and on the author's own experience of higher education in Latin America and particularly in Brazil (Schwartzman 1996; Schwartzman and Brunner 1993; Tyler 1997). Since a large part of the international outreach of American universities used to be done with the support of major private donors such as the Rockefeller and the Ford foundation, we will also delve into the changing orientations of these institutions.

The evolving tensions between social relevance and academic autonomy

Universities have always played important roles in their societies, and, while doing so, had to wrestle with the tensions between autonomy and external demands and constraints, basic and applied work and local and international or global drives. Modern universities are called to do academic research, promote culture, educate the elites, promote social mobility and inclusion, qualify their students for traditional and new professions, develop technology for industries, maintain complex medical facilities and provide a large array of services to governments, firms and communities, which of course is not to say that all universities are asked to do all this, let alone that they actually do it. Still, the enlarged breadth of tasks is notable.

The way universities deal with these multiple requests have varied enormously through time, raising the question of what remains, particularly in the large "multiversities" of today, so named by Clark Kerr (Kerr 1972), of the tiny, aristocratic universities of the past, to justify their claim of being the same kind of institution. One answer may be that they share the "idea of university" that Cardinal John H. Newman identified in the 19th century as liberal education (Newman 1959), and George Fallis elaborated recently in terms of the combinations of four main functions, liberal education for the elite, graduate education and research, professional education, and accessible education and applied research (Fallis 2007). These functions are often in tension or conflict, and universities vary according to the priorities they give to each; but they tend

to share a common element, namely the belief that the university faculties should be autonomous in defining what is to be researched and taught, because they are the main depositaries and often the source of the knowledge they develop and impart, as scholars, researchers and teachers. Whatever shape and denomination the universities have, and whatever activities they carry, it is their role as knowledge institutions that gives them their distinctive identity.

One may ask how much of this distinctiveness remains in today's time of mass higher education, in which so many institutions, in different parts of word, have become purely teaching institutions, while research is concentrated in a few places and very often in government or private, non-teaching institutes. Still, studies on the academic profession in different parts of the work show that academics tend to give strong priority to their work as researchers, through which they ascertain their intellectual autonomy and professional prestige, even in countries with very extensive teaching-only institutions such as Brazil, Mexico, China and Malaysia.

Regarding your own preferences, do your interests lie primarily in teaching or in research?					
	Primarily in teaching	In both, but leaning towards teaching	In both, but leaning towards research	Primarily in research	Total
Norway	1%	10%	42%	46%	100%
Germany	10%	18%	40%	32%	100%
Australia	7%	23%	41%	29%	100%
Finland	14%	21%	38%	27%	100%
United Kingdom	11%	22%	44%	23%	100%
Japan	6%	23%	57%	14%	100%
Canada	6%	26%	54%	14%	100%
Italy	2%	21%	65%	12%	100%
Hong Kong	9%	28%	52%	11%	100%
United States	22%	34%	34%	10%	100%
Portugal	8%	37%	46%	9%	100%
Argentina	7%	36%	50%	7%	100%
Korea, Republic of	3%	29%	61%	7%	100%
Brazil	8%	42%	42%	7%	100%
Mexico	20%	38%	36%	7%	100%
China	11%	42%	42%	5%	100%
Malaysia	8%	44%	43%	4%	100%
Source: The Changing Academic Profession Project, 2008					

When asked, most researchers would say that their work has important applied implications and relevance; however, they would also claim the need for research freedom and the ability to pursue their intellectual curiosity

unhindered by short or medium-term considerations of practical outcomes. There is a large literature dealing with this tension, which basically says that, in fact, there are different ways, or “modes” of doing science, related to the institutional settings in which the scientific activity takes place and the values and motivations that drive the scientist’s work. Two references would be enough to make this idea more explicit. One is the distinction between “mode I” and “mode II” of knowledge production proposed in a book by Gibbons and others, which draws two “ideal types” of research work. The first mode is more typical of classic universities, organized along scientific disciplines, with clear institutional separation between academic and applied work, assessed through disciplinary peer review, and based on an implicit assumption of a “linear sequence” of knowledge production, from basic to applied science, and from there to technological development and practical results. The second mode is more inter- or multidisciplinary, with no clear boundaries and barriers between basic and applied work, working under no assumptions about the sequence between basic research and applications, and more typical of industrial laboratories and also university research institutions with strong linkages with external users and stakeholders (Gibbons, Trow, Scott, Schwartzman, Nowotny, and Limoges 1994).

The other reference is the elaboration, by Donald E Stokes, of the idea of different “quadrants” of science, defined by the way the scientists combine the quest for fundamental understanding and considerations of use: the “Pasteur’s quadrant” (use-inspired, basic research); the “Bohr’s quadrant” (pure, basic research) and the “Thomas Edison’s quadrant” (applied research). (Stokes 1997). The Bohr’s quadrant is probably the most prestigious in academic circles, while Thomas Edison is closer to the popular view of the lone scientist inventing applied gadgets in his garage. The Pasteur quadrant, however, is probably the most prevalent and easily identified in fields such as agriculture, medical research and engineering.

To say that science is produced according to one or another of these modes, or models, does not tell us anything about the relevance, validity or truthfulness of the scientific findings, theories and applications being produced, as the examples

of Pasteur, Bohr and Thomas Edison illustrate. It tells us very much, however, about the way the scientific work is organized, both within the scientific institutions and in its relations with the broader society. Although “mode II” was presented by the 1994 Gibbons book as a novelty, it is possible to argue that, historically, this is the more traditional way of doing research, from ancient times in China through the development of medicine, engineering, industrial technology, weaponry and agriculture in the last several centuries; while the organization of scientific research as an academic endeavor, with all its assumptions of self-rule and shared knowledge, is a much more recent development (Ben-David 1971; Merton 1973; Polanyi 1997).

More specifically, it is possible to argue that the more academic, “mode I” type of research is very much a product of the modern research universities, whose origin is often attributed to the mythical Berlin University of Alexander Humboldt in early 19th century (Bertilsson 1992; Nybom 2007), but actually came into being first in Oxford and Cambridge in England and later in the more prestigious American universities such as Harvard and Johns Hopkins in the US, and was accompanied by the creation of specialized scientific associations, scientific journals and science foundation agencies, all under the control of the scientific community itself. In his book, Donald Stokes stresses the historical nature of this divide, dating back from the 19th century, and reinforced in the US with the famous Vannevar Bush’s report, *Science, the Endless Frontier* (Bush 1945).

In practice, this “modern” way of doing academic science has always coexisted, in the more developed economies, with the other, more “traditional” modes (Latour 1993). The renewed concern for making explicit this coexistence has been described more recently in terms of “innovation” systems, defined by the coexistence of a wide range of institutions – academic, industrial, governmental, public, private – which produces knowledge in different ways, with intense circulation of people, information and resources among different institutions and geographical areas (Branscomb and Keller 1998; Branscomb, Kodama, and Florida 1999; Gibbons 2004; Mowery and Rosenberg 1998; Nelson 1993). What is new in recent years is the pressure that has been built upon academic science

and their institutions to confront the need to establish more direct links with the world of applications, to open spaces for interdisciplinarity, to be more entrepreneurial, to deal with the issues of intellectual property, and to link more strongly with external stakeholders.

It has not always been possible for the universities to maintain alive their central ideas of autonomy and self-rule. Today, it is common to use the expressions “higher” or “tertiary” education to refer to the large array of public and private institutions that impart some kind of teaching service for a growing number of students of all ages and motivations, while the pressure on many institutions to link their research with the demands of external clients has undermined to a large extent the traditional notions of academic autonomy and freedom of research. For some, this is the way it should be, with the old universities abandoning their pretenses and becoming efficient service providers for its clients. For others, these are destructive tendencies, which are transforming the academic institutions beyond recognition, with great loss for society, which is being deprived from their irreplaceable centers of learning, independent thinking and knowledge creation. In practice, as the universities take up new roles, they have to find new ways to reassert and reestablish their nature as autonomous and independent centers of culture and learning, which is, after all, why different sectors in society look for their services and provide them with support in the first place.

This tension between the two modes of academic production also appears when universities engage in international cooperation and outreach activities of different kinds. On one hand, they try to extend the academic mode to other places and regions, expecting to create an ever-larger international scientific community; at the same time, they are asked to perform other roles, having to do with institutional development, technical assistance, increasing revenues and other practical goals, and this tension has consequences regarding the kind of knowledge they develop and impart, some of which is discussed in this text.

From imperial science to academic cooperation

After World War II, there was a general sense of optimism and expectations of a new era of progress and growing welfare in developing regions, fostered by the

creation of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the end of the old empires and the expectations about the benefits that would come from the civilian adaptation of the new technologies developed for the war. These views were supported by a substantial literature on social and political modernization, developed mostly in academic circles in the US and adopted by students coming from other countries to get their doctoral degrees and returning to their universities with a strong commitment to these ideas (Almond and Verba 1963; Apter 1965; Eisenstadt 1966; Eisenstadt 1963; Germani 1970; Inkeles and Smith 1974; Pye 1962).

Much before the United States, France, England, Germany and the Netherlands were very active in exporting scientific and higher education institutions to their colonies, and, when the colonial empires disintegrated, to the countries that remained under their spheres of influence. Lewis Pyenson has written extensively on what he called “scientific imperialism”, documenting the cases of France, Germany and the Dutch in Indonesia up to World War II. His studies show how the spread of science was associated with the geopolitical interests of the colonial powers, but also fostered science as an independent intellectual endeavor, and created the seeds of national research traditions in the colonies (Pyenson 1985; Pyenson 1989; Pyenson 1990; Pyenson 1993).

In Latin America, Spain and Portugal shaped the academic institutions created in the region since the early 16th century. The Spanish, with the Catholic Church, were quick to establish the universities in Mexico, Peru, the Dominican Republic already in the 16th century, followed by others in Argentina, Bolivia, Chile and other countries, as part of a brilliant but short-lived period of intellectual effervescence in Spain (Linz 1972). Portugal did not follow the same path, but had its own version of intellectual renewal in the 18th century, and, when the Portuguese court moved to Brazil in 1808, during the Napoleonic Wars, it established the first research and higher education institutions in the country, which later benefited from close cultural and intellectual ties with France (Carvalho 1980; Maxwell 1995; Schwartzman 1991). Roy MacLeod analyzed the British case, from the glorious days of Imperial Science in early 20th century to the effort to establish a “science commonwealth” after World War II. Following

Pyenson, he shows how British imperial science played multiple roles as a means of enlarging Western knowledge about the larger world; as a colonizing ideology; as an instrument of self-identity; as a dimension of colonial culture; and as a commonwealth practice.

A similar development occurred in France, with the creation of the "*Office de la Recherche Scientifique Coloniale*" by the Vichy government in 1943, as a way to link French science with its colonies, changing its name to *Office de la recherche scientifique et technique outre-mer* (ORSTOM) which has kept this denomination until 1999, when it was renamed *l'Institut de Recherche pour le Développement* (IRD). This change of names reflect, like in Britain, an evolution from the imperial ambitions of the past to the more complex world of today (Bonneuil and Petitjean 1996; Schwartzman 1995; Waast 1995).

The onset of the Cold War and the independence movements of the former British and French colonies did not erode the expectations around the benefits of science, higher education and modernization, but changed the way the policies of international academic outreach were to be carried on, particularly in the United States, whose influence rapidly overshadowed that of the former Imperial powers. The threats of authoritarianism and Communism where always present (Huntington 1968; Lipset 1960) and technical assistance and international outreach were deemed necessary to make sure that the countries would not take the wrong paths. International outreach became part of the cold war, an effort of the US and other Western countries to conquer and keep the minds and bodies of the populations in developing countries away from the Soviet Union and communism. For some, this was perceived as a kind of neocolonialism, an effort of Western powers to perpetuate the dominance of local oligarchies and thwart the efforts for autonomy and self-determination of developing countries. In most part, however, the combination of fresh money and fresh ideas brought by international outreach was usually well received, as an opportunity for the countries to modernize their institutions and develop their economy. In the ideological debates of those years, modernization, as an alternative to Soviet-style socialism, was also a revolutionary perspective, challenging the traditional oligarchies that kept the developing countries poor. If fulfilled, it would bring

industrialization, wealth, education reform, institution building, individual freedom and democracy. To achieve these goals, old universities had to be reformed and new universities had to be created, and, for that, they needed international support and the cooperation of scholars from the US and other developed countries.

Compared with the main Western powers, the efforts of Soviet Union to create its own version of international outreach did not go very far. In the 1930s, the perception that the Soviet Union was using science to create a better, more rational world attracted several important Western scientists, most notably the leading British scientists John D. Bernal, who argued for a close and explicit association of scientific research and social and economic development, as the Soviet Union was supposedly doing (Bernal 1939). The Moscow trials, however, and more particularly the violent attacks on “bourgeois science” following the Lysenko affair (Graham 1993), placed a limit on how far this cooperation between Western and Soviet scientists could go. During the Cold War, the most important Soviet initiative of academic outreach for the establishment of the Patrice Lumumba Peoples’ Friendship University for Third World students, mostly from Asia and Africa, some of which became famous as political leaders and militants on the left.

The golden years of international cooperation

Historically, American higher education used to be inward-looking institutions, except when looking at Germany or England for models of high quality, research institutions some of its leaders believed they should follow (Fincher 1996; Flexner 1968). As the American international presence increased in the 20th century, it was followed by initiatives to create American-like academic institutions abroad. Early examples are the Peking Union Medical College, established in 1906 and the American University in Cairo of 1919, both led by American religious missionaries. Since the early 20th century, the Rockefeller Foundation has been very active throughout the world, particularly in the areas of public health and agriculture, supporting capacity building and research, providing fellowships for international scholars to come to the US, supporting American scholars doing “expatriate” work in foreign institutions, and engaging

in institutions building. By 1960 it had active programs with 35 universities and research institutes in less developing countries. In 1961, the Rockefeller Foundation decided to concentrate its efforts of institution building in 10 universities in less developed countries, and in 1973 added three other universities, an experience which ended in 1983 (Coleman 1984; Coleman and Court 1993). In Brazil, the Rockefeller Foundation established a close cooperation program with the Faculty of Medicine in São Paulo in 1916, and participated very actively in the campaigns for the eradication of yellow fever and ancylostomiasis in the country, helping to organize the country's public health institutions (Schwartzman 1991, chapter 7).

The Rockefeller foundation was not alone. The period of expansion of public support for higher education in the US after Sputnik brought also very significant expansion of these early initiatives of international outreach. At the height of the Cold War, the early initiatives of the Rockefeller foundation became a generalized practice for governments, private institutions and foundations in the United States and Europe, all sharing the notion that it would be possible to develop local higher education and research capabilities in developing countries through international assistance, and that this would be a crucial input for their further development, protecting them from social and economic unrest and the temptations of Communism. Daniel C. Levy describes the 1960-1975 period as the "golden age" of international outreach for Latin America, with a special emphasis on the region's universities:

This was modern history's most ambitious, organized, non-military effort to export progress -- to provide less developed countries with material resources, ideas, and expertise, for them to leap forward. This was the peak era of international assistance for large-scale institutional and national development. It was also a period of high hope for Third World domestic reforms. These reforms often contemplated a grandiose importing of progress. Domestic policy reformers wanted to import much of what the industrialized countries were eager to share, including through partnership projects explicitly designed for export-import linkage. And both the exporters and importers of assistance anointed no social institution more than the university to lead the great transformation to modernity (Levy 2005, p 1).

The US military became also very involved in supporting research abroad, as they did domestically. In Brazil, one of the most positive examples of the benefits of international cooperation is the Institute of Aeronautics Technology, ITA, still considered the best engineering school in the country, which gave raise to the successful Embraer airplane industry today. ITA's origins are related to the interchange between the American and Brazilian air forces in World War II, which made it possible for a small group of Brazilian air force officers to come to study at MIT. In the 1940s these officers convinced the Brazilian government to create ITA within the Air Force but as a civilian engineering school, and invited Richard Smith, formerly a professor at MIT, to become its first rector (Botelho 1999). Beyond ITA, the US Air Force developed a wide program of scientific cooperation with Latin American institutions in the period, which included different kinds of topics in basic research, including the physiology of electric fish or the variations of the earth's magnetic field (Bushnell 1965).

In his careful analysis of these "golden years", Daniel C. Levy finds that, contrary to the views that came to prevail later, important and positive results came out of this cooperation. In many countries, international support was matched with local resources to build new institutions, send students abroad, create research departments and programs, and improve the quality of higher education.

The development of area studies in the US.

The growth of academic international outreach was accompanied in the US by the development of a large number of centers and institutes of "area studies" for Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Soviet Union. In 2003 David L. Szanton, from the University of California at Berkeley, coordinated a broad overview of this experience, which is available on line (Szanton 2003). In the 1970s, Ford Foundation and other private and public agencies stimulated the creation of area studies in the leading US research universities, supporting research, graduate education and international exchange. Although the stimulus for this movement, like the growth of international outreach in the same period, had come from the Cold War, and was drastically reduced afterwards, the way these area studies developed went much beyond these initial motivations, and represented, according to Szanton and collaborators, a genuine and valuable contribution to

reduce American parochialism and, through interdisciplinary work, to break the institutional barriers that tend to keep the disciplinary departments isolated from each other in the American universities. Paul Drake and Lisa Hilbink, who did the review of Latin American studies for this project, noted that, in 2003, the area was going through a period of diminished support and credibility, but were very supportive of its achievements, particularly in terms of the symmetry it was able to create in the relations between North and South American scholars and institutions, noting that

Latin Americanists have developed and/or contributed to some of the most important and influential theories and debates in the social sciences and humanities in recent history. From dependency to democratization, from studies on the state to research on social movements, scholars of Latin America have been at the forefront of theoretical development in a variety of disciplines. Despite these achievements, Latin American studies in the United States, along with all foreign-area studies, is suffering from a decline in intellectual and material support (p. 2).

The impact of international cooperation on higher education in Latin America

In his analysis of the “golden years” of international outreach, Daniel Levy noted that this movement was not strong enough to change Latin American higher education as a whole, yet was very influential in improving it at its best.

Traditionally, Latin American universities worked as licensing institutions for the professions, with strict governmental supervision and oversight, and in the early 20th century they were swept by a strong reform movement that empowered students and academics an increased their autonomy, without however improving their quality (Schwartzman 1996; Van Aken 1971; Walter 1969).

The Reform movement established the principle of tri-partite government of students, professors and alumni that in many institutions replaced the traditional professorial congregations, and have recently been replaced, again, by assemblies of professors, students and employees. The problem with these collective bodies is not so much their composition, but that they go well beyond what one would expect from legislative bodies. They control the acts of the administration in their minimum details, and often at all levels - departments,

courses, institutes, schools, universities. Universities' administrators not only have to play politics to be appointed, but have also to play politics to have their acts approved and implemented on a daily basis, making everything slow and complicated.

Governance in private institutions often goes to the other extreme. Central administrators are appointed by the owners (or, in Catholic Universities, by the Church), and usually lack collective bodies to temper and compensate for the top-heaviness that prevail. Sometimes this is a blessing, giving the institutions much more freedom to innovate and to respond to changing conditions and demand of the education market. But, in many countries like Brazil and Colombia private institutions cater to the poorer and less demanding social segments, and their freedom of action usually leads to poor products to sell.

No wonder that governance in Latin American academic institutions is so often paralyzed, or unable to put forward policies that go against one actor or another. But the very existence of a plurality of interests and groups opens the space for institutional leadership. In some places more than others, it is possible to find researchers unhappy with their working conditions, students pressing for better education, professionals concerned with their standards, external sources willing to bring support to new projects and initiatives.

It was precisely in these spaces that international cooperation could work at its best, providing high-quality education to promising students, stimulating new fields of research, and creating new epistemic communities linking scholars in the developed and developing world. This is what Daniel Levy meant with his statement that, although international cooperation could not change higher education in broad terms, it provided important contributions to some of the best parts of the system (which was not a matter of pouring assistance into high peaks as many of the favored targets were very modest in capabilities), with the hope that they could become the seeds for broader changes.

The crisis of international outreach

Already in the 1960s, however, the confluence of interests that brought together the American government, private foundations, the American universities, Latin

American governments and important sectors of the emerging scientific community in the Latin American region, started to come under strain, and, in the 1980s and afterwards, international outreach had changed almost completely. In the following, we will look at some illuminating points of this transition.

The Camelot project: international research and the cold war

An early sign of the crisis was the so-called “Camelot affair” of 1965. This was an ambitious project supported by the US Department of Defense to study the dynamics of Latin American societies and to prevent the possibility of guerrilla movements to emerge, in a time when Fidel Castro and Che Guevara’s influence was growing in the region. The affair involved outstanding members of the sociological scientific community in the US, and generated a large number of publications analyzing its events and implications (Galtung 1974; Horowitz 1974; Jacobs 1967; Robin 2008; Silvert 1965; Solovey 2001)

As it was typical of the cold war years, the project had a clear military and strategic goal, and, given the amount of resources involved, it was also an opportunity for academic social scientists in the US and abroad to develop research and learn more about the social dynamics in the region. The project was elaborated by the Special Operations Research Office of the American University, with the cooperation of a panel of distinguished social scientists³, and in 1965 it started to recruit Latin American social scientists to participate, without necessarily explaining the full nature and intent of the project. Johan Galtung, a Norwegian sociologist then teaching at UNESCO’s Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences in Chile (FLACSO), denounced the project in public, leading to a storm of protests and criticisms that led to the project’s cancellation a few months later by the US government, after a thorough investigation carried on by

³ The initial list of consultants for the Camelot project included well-known social scientists such as Jessie Bernard, Frank Bonilla, James S. Coleman, Lewis Coser, Theodore Draper, S. N. Eisenstadt, Gino Germani, W. J. Goode, William Kornhauser, Thomas C. Schelling, Neil Smelser and Gordon Tullock. For the full list, see Solovey 2001.

the Special Investigation Committee of the Chilean House of Representatives. In the US Presidential order that closed the project, it was determined that "no government sponsorship of foreign area research should be undertaken which in the judgment of the Secretary of State would adversely affect the United States foreign relations."⁴

Camelot may have been peculiar and extreme in the way it was conceived and in the clumsiness of the way their promoters tried to implement it. This episode led to a flurry of texts and comments about what happened, some commemorating the closure of the project, others deploring the loss of a golden opportunity to bring more resources and learn more about the region. In the American academic context, Gabriel Almond criticized the project not because of its intent, but because of the disproportionate amount of resources provided by the military, which threatened the freedom of social scientists by restricting their possibilities of choice. A typical reaction was that from the anthropologist Milton Jacobs, who blamed the fiasco on the control of federal research funds and programs by Washington bureaucrats, and concluded that "it would indeed be tragic if the aftermath of Camelot prevents anthropologists and others from working with AID, the Peace Corps, and other agencies" (Jacobs 1967 p. 365).

Jessie Bernard, on the other hand, a distinguished sociologist who was part of the original Camelot team, argued that the notion of a non-committed social science was a myth, but the presence of the social scientists in such a project could have important and positive effects. As summarized by Ron Robins,

The sociologist Jesse Bernard brushed aside those who criticized Camelot's participants for selling their soul to the predatory designs of the state and its military establishment. As for the integrity of the social sciences, in general, Bernard had no patience for nostalgic reconstructions of a pristine academy. In fact, she argued that as far as the United States was concerned, an immaculate academic

⁴ The best English source and discussion of the episode is probably the article published by Galtung himself a few years later in a book edited by Irving Louis Horowitz (Galtung 1974). Most references and quotations used here are based on this book.

enterprise had never existed. The modern university was tied cheek and jowl to the nation state, and any suggestion to the contrary was either disingenuous or masterfully misinformed. (...) Bernard argued that the presence of competent social scientists embedded in military projects had an overtly benign effect as sociologists and their intellectual kin often offered alternatives to the military's knee-jerk recourse to violence. Bernard argued that in modern conflicts research may actually contribute to conflict avoidance and resolution. Bernard and other key Camelot explained that "every example of violence in a conflict may be said to represent a failure in strategy. For when, or if, strategic solutions are available, strategy may supplant violence."

Rockefeller Foundation and the demise of the development university

University Development in the Third World, published by James S. Coleman⁵ and David Court in 1993, is a precious post-mortem of the efforts of the Rockefeller Foundation to foster the creation of "development universities" in the Third World (Coleman and Court 1993). As they described it, in 1961 the Trustees of the Rockefeller Foundation initiated a major program to support selected universities in the Third World, the University Development Program. This program was an effort to build on the Foundation's previous decades of experiences of international outreach, and to concentrate on what the universities thought they could do best, institution building, described by Coleman as "the combination of its explicit long-term commitment to specific universities; its field-staff operating mode, however incompletely applied; its breadth of disciplinary engagement and the concomitant concern, however insubstantially fulfilled, for the development of the institution as a whole; and the close integration of its fellowship program into a particular institution-building commitment" (Coleman 1984 p. 184).

In the following years, the Foundation concentrated resources on twelve universities in Latin America, Africa and Asia. What happened with these universities depended on the way they were approached, but also on events that

⁵ James Smoot Coleman, the political scientist, not to be confused with James Samuel Coleman, the sociologist who became famous as the author of the Coleman Report on American education.

went much beyond what the Rockefeller Foundation could do, as in Africa. Overall, Coleman and Court are able to point out four main achievements of these efforts. First, the establishment of academic communities, research traditions and scholarly values in the supported universities; second, the advanced professional training of more than one thousand able individuals who returned to build these academic communities and to play national and international leadership roles, both in universities and in public office. Third, the catalytic role that led to the involvement of other international agencies projects of international outreach. Fourth, through the visiting faculty program, the internationalization of American scholarship. On the negative side, Coleman and Court note the absence of an equity dimension in the programs, the failure of the attempts to promote interdisciplinarity, and the failure to develop regional centers of excellence. At the end, say the authors,

Perhaps the most disappointing outcome of the UDP [University Development Program] was the failure to generate an identifiable intellectual product – a new way of thinking about universities in developing countries, a new way to conceptualize development studies, some headway in reconstructing approaches to interdisciplinary research and training (Coleman and Court 1993 p . 339).

One of the most striking failures of the Rockefeller Foundation was the investment it did on the Federal University of Bahia (UFBA), in the city of Salvador, Brazil. Bahia is one of Brazil's poorest states, and the city of Salvador, Brazil's first capital, contains the largest black population of any city outside Africa. The decision to invest on UFBA, instead of doing in one of Brazil's leading universities in other states, was based on the idea that, with appropriate support, this regional institution could become a truly development university, and contribute to reduce the development imbalances among Brazilian regions. Between 1974 and 1983, the Foundation invested about 10 million dollars in UFBA, with very little results. (about US\$ 33 million in 2009 values). In the end, the Foundation recognized that the project was a failure, and withdrew its support.

The failure of UFBA challenged the whole conception of a “development university” the Rockefeller Foundation was trying to put forward, together with

other foundations and government agencies engaged in international outreach in those golden years. As described by Coleman and Court, the assumption at the time was that universities in the Third World had something central and special to contribute to the destiny of new nations that set them apart from established universities in the industrialized world:

Universities should continue to improve the relevance of teaching and research and contribute to manpower development. Their role however should go beyond these traditional functions and incorporate an expanded sense of purposes for their realization. Universities were to take responsibility for such things as increasing food production, addressing the poverty of rural populations, advising governments on housing construction, as well as social engineering to improve ethnic balance and national integration. The new touchstones of university quality were its vocational and service contribution and its social commitment (Coleman and Court, 1993, p. 295).

The problem with this view, however, as the authors reflected on this experience, was that it neglected the need for the universities to develop as well-established and esteemed institutions in terms of their more classical functions, before they could perform broader roles.

After twenty years the University Development Program, renamed midway as “Education Development Program”, came to an end. The reasons for it were not the eventual mistakes committed, which could be corrected after a proper evaluation of the experience of twenty years, but “had to do with the fact that it run out of intellectual steam. The long-term commitment and original vision could not reproduce themselves”. “With the phasing out of the program in 1983 the Rockefeller Foundation entered a period of several years when its international activities lacked rationale, coherence and conviction” (p. 350). Times had changed, beliefs on the benefits of international outreach had waned, and it was difficult to see what to do next.

Ford Foundation: from academic research to social activism and human rights

Ford Foundation played a very important role in the creation of academic and research institutions in different countries in Latin America, and in providing the social sciences community with support in the years of authoritarian repression.

Daniel Levy, compiling data from different sources, showed that Ford Foundation spent about 73 million dollars in support for Latin American universities between 1959 and 1984. He also shows how these investments decreased dramatically, from a peak of 26 million dollars in 1965-1969 to a little more than two million in 1980-1984, a pattern also followed by the US Agency for International Development, AID, and, as we have seen, by the Rockefeller Foundation. Most of the support was given to universities in the more developed countries, with Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico as the largest recipients, places where the chances of having a strong impact in introducing institutional change and fostering research was stronger.

Ford Foundation investments in Latin American universities, 1959-1984 (millions of US dollars)						
	1959-64	1965-69	1970-74	1975-79	1980-84	Total
Argentina	2,611	935	542	-35	0	4,053
Brasil	3,749	9,390	6,207	2,516	1,843	23,705
Chile	4,144	9,721	6,572	224	0	20,661
Mexico	1,920	3,167	1,973	1,973	685	9,718
other countries	8,447	3,279	3,141	768	-160	15,475
Total	20,871	26,492	18,435	5,446	2,368	73,612
Source: Levy 2005, Appendix H						

Levy discusses the reasons for this drop in support, and lists, among other things, the growing belief in the US and in agencies such as the World Bank that universities were elite institutions, that investment in higher education was socially regressive, and that, in any case, they were not fulfilling the “development” role that they were expected to meet. There was also a clear link with the political changes in the region. In Chile, where Ford Foundation supported a major cooperation program between the Universidad de Chile and the University of California, most of the support was withdrawn after Pinochet’s intervention in the universities. In Argentina, support dwindled rapidly after the General Carlos Onganía’s coup against the Humberto Illia government in 1965 and the violent intervention in the Universidad de Buenos Aires, causing hundreds of academics to resign (Morero, Eidelman, and Lichtman 2002; Rotunno, de Guijarro, and Garcia 2003). In Brazil, where the universities were less affected by the 1964 military took-over, support remained until the early seventies, but also dropped later on.

Besides the misgivings on the donor's side, these changes were also a consequence of the growing identification of Ford Foundation officers with the Latin American scientists they supported, and who were victims of political repression by the new military regimes. A good picture of this situation can be gathered from the report of a 1970 Conference convened by the Ford Foundation in May, 1970, in Buenos Aires (Schwartzman 1993).⁶ In those years, dependency theory was on the rise, and many countries (including Brazil, Chile, Argentina and Peru) were under military dictatorships. The Latin Americans bombarded the Ford Foundation officers with the dangers of cultural and philanthropic imperialism and the need to take ideologies and social class considerations in their activities. The policy statement draft was very precise in reproducing the Latin American views on these matters, while stressing that they were the Latin Americans', not the North Americans' point of view. "It was stated clearly," said the draft, "that the task of combining methods and resources to gain educational development is not only technical in nature; it is also ideological, ethical and moral." "Some felt," the document goes on, "that most efforts to 'modernize' education are, in the main, importations of educational trends in developed countries which further economic, technical and cultural dependency." Agreeing or not, the document emphasized that the Foundation must be sensitive and responsive to these themes shared through the region, and was glad to notice that the Foundation was accepted as a partner in the process of development and change, and that more Latin Americans must be involved in the process of developing its programs. The document conceded, furthermore, that "education is a creation of a society as part of the general socialization process," and as such

⁶ "Report on a Conference on the Educational Experience of Latin America, The Ford Foundation, September, 1970 (mimeographed); and Draft: Policy Statement on Ford Foundation Assistance to Latin American Education" written by R. Drysdale and R. Sharpe, July, 1971. These documents are part of the Ford Foundation archives in Rio de Janeiro, as mentioned in Schwartzman 1993. The meeting brought together the leadership of Ford Foundation's Latin American sector (including Reynold Carlson, William Carmichael, Reuben Frodin, K. N. Rao, Kalman H. Silvert and Abraham Lowenthal), and several well known Latin American social scientists working on education, including Patrício Cariola and Ernesto Shiefelbein from Chile, Aldo Solari from Uruguay, Aparecida Jolly Gouveia from Brazil, besides a few practitioners of different countries.

it was not neutral, but could play either a conservative or an innovative role, depending of the group and sector promoting it. More to the point, the report concluded that, "while debate and consideration of ideology and educational goals are urgently called for and desired (. . .), there is a cold, hard reality that must be faced. It may be that the education which is actually received by those lucky enough to gain the opportunity has little to do with the goals and plans set by the policy makers. The system has little capacity to respond to their dictates."

The basic recommendation of the report was that educational change in the region could only come about as a fruit of the labors of Latin Americans, and that the Foundation could help supporting the creation of a competent, modern leadership. Educational research and development should be strengthened, and the decision-making capacity of key institutions should be increased. The research component should not be limited to specialists on education, but "based upon the disciplines of the social and behavioral scientists"; and should include practical, as well as conceptual and analytic components: "not only must the purely epistemological issues be confronted; we must also be concerned with the problems of implementation, including feasibility and outcome"; "there should be some leverage effect [in research activities], in the sense that findings should reflect existing resource allocation decisions." There was also a recommendation not to use the Foundation's resources to establish some kind of new, large and multi-functional regional institution, as suggested by some participants in the conference. Instead, the policy should be to work with the existing institutions, and, because of the training component, there was also a "clear bias toward the university base in whatever form may be possible and consistent with the type of research to be stressed in a given situation".

In those years, officers of the Ford Foundation in Latin America were involved in protecting former grantees from the military repression, providing them with fellowships in the country and abroad, and finding ways of providing support for private institutions where they could continue to work away from the universities from where they were expelled, and in protecting human rights in general (Puryear 1991; Puryear 1994).

In the seventies and eighties, Ford Foundation continued to support education and other applied fields, but became ever more involved with issues of human rights and social promotion (Sikkink 1993). The table of contents of a celebratory book published on its 40th anniversary in Brazil, in 2002, summarizes the story of its transition: chapter 1, from agricultural production to sustainable development; chapter 2, from science teacher training to education reform; chapter 3, from population studies to reproductive health; chapter 4, from public administration to democratic participation; chapter 5, from social analysis to human rights (Brooke and Witoszynsky 2002). In 2004, for the first time, the Ford Foundation office in Brazil stopped providing support to education, putting all its weight on issues such as affirmative action, environment protection, the strengthening of civil society and sexuality and reproductive health.

The World Bank and the dilemmas of international outreach

The best illustration of the transformations and dilemmas of international outreach by the end of the 20th century was the World Bank under the leadership of James Wolfensohn, who headed the institution between 1995 and 2005 (from Bill Clinton to George W. Bush) and was the subject of a lively journalistic book by Sebastian Mallaby (Mallaby 2004).

The World Bank was created after World War II, as part of the Bretton Woods agreements, as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, to make loans to governments in order to rebuild railroads, highways, bridges, ports and other infrastructure that had been destroyed or damaged by the War. In 1968, under Robert McNamara, the Bank made a dramatic shift on its priorities, placing the issues of poverty at its core (Ayres 1983), and, at the same, invested heavily in transforming the bank into a world-class “intellectual actor”. With around 800 professional economists and a budget of about 25 million dollars a year for research, the Bank became the world’s largest economics research institution, mostly dedicated to applied economics and development studies, but including also specialists in sociology, political science, demography, statistics, education and other related disciplines (Stern and Ferreira 1997).

To deal with poverty, the Bank increased its investment in the social sector (education, environment, population, water supply and sanitation), and shifted its priorities from Europe to middle-income developing countries that had the ability to contract its loans. Education, according to the economic theories of human capital, was considered to be, at the same time, a direct investment in the well-being of individuals and in productivity of the economy as a whole. In the 1970s and 1980s, the World Bank had concluded from estimations of rates of return that it was necessary to give priority to basic education, where the returns were higher, and reduce public investments in higher education, which should be supported as much as possible by those who benefited from it (Psacharopoulos and Hinchliffe 1973; Psacharopoulos and Patrinos 2004). In the late 1990s, the Bank realized the importance of science, technology and higher education for development, producing a series of documents supporting this view (Chen and Dahlman 2004; De Ferranti, Perry, Gill, Guasch, and Schady 2002; World Bank 1994; World Bank 1998; World Bank 2002). A comprehensive overview of the initiatives in the areas of science and technology showed that the Bank had lent \$8.6 billion dollars to directly support S&T activities through 647 projects for the 1980-2004 period, corresponding to 11% of all Bank's projects at the time (Crawford, Yammal, Yang, and Brezenoff 2006 p. 10-12). Most of these resources went for projects in the agricultural sector, but there were also projects to support the development of science, technology and higher education. In this review, the authors note how support for science and technology fell in the early 1990s, and their views of the experience are not very flattering: "maybe with the exception of long-term support to agricultural research, the analysis of S&T projects over the last 25 years reveals no consistent approach or strategy on the part of the Bank toward developing S&T capacity in its client countries". (...) "Regarding nonagricultural projects in general, the Bank's approach has been ad hoc, experimenting with different mechanisms for different circumstances as they occurred." (pp. 27-28).

As describe by Mallaby (p. 49), James Wolferson took office in Madrid while street demonstrators demanded the closure of the Bank, shouting, "fifty years is enough". They charged the Bank with being an arm of the International

Monetary Fund in the implementation of adjustment policies that were forcing the poor countries to cut their budgets, dismantle their welfare systems, privatize public companies and open their economies to international capitalism; and also for providing support for corrupt dictatorships which happened to side with the West in the cold war. The image of the World Bank economist travelling first class from Washington to a third world capital, carrying a case with money for corrupt dictators, became engraved in the public image, and the structural adjustments being forced upon the countries were perceived as products of a deleterious pact between the bureaucrat and the autocrat.

To a large extent, this situation had developed as a consequence of the Bank's alignment with the United States foreign policy during the cold war, and also with the structural adjustment policies implemented worldwide by the International Monetary Fund as a response to the debt crisis in the 1980s. The adjustment policies sponsored by the IMF were not helping most countries to reactivate their economies, and the Bank's association with these policies collided with its efforts to become a champion of policies against poverty.

Wolferson worked to change this situation, creating or recovering the Bank's image as a caring institution, concerned about poverty and the environment, and intolerant with corruption. To care for the environment, the Bank introduced strict requirements for environment impact assessments of its projects, and reduced support to the construction of water dams that could lead to the dislocation of populations, threats to native species and lead to environment degradation. To stay away from corrupt governments, the Bank started to provide resources directly to the populations in need, rather than to governments or public bureaucracies, or to tie its loans or donations to mechanisms and institutions that could assure that they would be properly used. Reform of the public sector in developing and transition countries, with the creation of modern and efficient institutions, became a priority.

Thus, he tried to give new life to the project of Robert McNamara to make the fight against poverty the first priority, but with one important difference. While McNamara was the quintessential technocrat, building the Bank's research capabilities and trying to find the best ways to deal with the issues of poverty,

Wolferson considered that the Bank had to hear and respond to the demands and criticism coming from non-governmental organizations, and to be as radical as possible on its commitment with the poor, bypassing if necessary its own experts and their views. In this process, he also came often in conflict with the banks' staff, who saw their established practices questioned and often overruled by the shifting ideological changes at the top (Castro 2002)

As the Bank embraced the readjustment policies in the 80s and the new social agendas of the 90s and later years, it may have lost some of its credibility with the broader "epistemic community" of economists and policy specialists within and outside the bank who provided intellectual guidance to its policies in the past, but was never able to assure the trust of the new constituencies based on non-governmental organizations involved with the issues of human rights, poverty and the environment. In 1983, when Bank started to move to include "social pricing" considerations in their projects, a study showed that the changes were strongly resisted by Bank's technical staff, because, among other things, they were perceived as lowering their professional and technical standards. As stated by the author,

Adler and Haas have interpreted this situation in terms of the shifting epistemic communities within the Bank and its consequences:

The involvement of new epistemic communities caused the World Bank to lurch from support of one series of development goals and policies to another, varying from building infrastructures to eliminating poverty to encouraging export-oriented growth. Throughout this episode, the development-oriented food aid epistemic community sought to promote its own preferred economic policies, in competition with other epistemic communities and subject to the strong institutional pressures within the World Bank. When an epistemic community loses its consensus, its authority is diminished and decision makers tend to pay less attention to its advice (Adler and Haas 1992 p. 385).

During the Wolferson period these tensions intensified, among other things by the introduction of new actors in the external interactions and in the very institutional fabric of the Bank, the non-governmental organizations and their representatives. In their detailed review of the extensive research activities of the World Bank through the years, Stern and Ferreira note that, among the

persons interviewed for their review, few of them “saw the Bank as having a major role of intellectual leadership in the economics profession” (p. 597). They believe that this is as it should be, given the Bank’s characteristics as a project-oriented agency, and not an independent research institutions or university.

Being a large and complex institution, the Bank continued to develop analyses, publish reports and implement projects both in the new and the more traditional sectors, sometimes with good results, sometimes with less – but it never became the world champion institution for economic development and poverty reduction, as dreamed by Robert McNamara and James Wolferson. Meanwhile, the new emphasis placed by the Bank on issues of poverty, human rights and climate change were also adopted by other international organizations, private foundations universities and research centers in the US and other parts of the world, replacing the old agenda of economic development and modernization.

Changes in higher education: privatization, globalization and massification

The end of the cold war and failures of international academic cooperation described above coincided with deep transformations in higher education in the US and other countries, sometimes described in terms of “globalization” and “privatization”. These trends have been subject to extensive analysis (Altbach 1999; Bjarnason, Cheng, Fielden, Lemaitre, and Levy 2009; Brunner 2009; García Guadilla 2005; Slancheva and Levy 2007), and the opportunities and threats they represent were very clearly stated sometime ago by Frank Newman, founder of *The Futures Project (Policy for Higher Education in a Changing World)* and former president of the University of Rhode Island:

Over the last half-century, higher education grew in size, resources, and importance. All the while, it maintained a remarkably stable structure. Now, powerful changes are under way, driven by the entry of new providers, rapid advances in technology, demographic shifts, and the globalization of markets and institutions that typically has been open only to indigenous institutions. As higher education's environments become increasingly competitive, the reins of government are loosening worldwide in favor of market-driven decision-making - a trend that alone would disturb the tranquility of a stable, confident system. (Newman 2000 p. 17).

The most important change that led to the current situation was the transformation of higher education from elite to mass institutions, an almost universal phenomenon of the last decades that multiplied the demand for higher education and had a dramatic impact on the ways universities used to be conceived and to operate and the strengthening of academic managerialism (Trow 1973; Trow 1993). The novelty was not just that traditional universities, private and public, started to be managed like private corporations, but the emergence of a new generation of privately owned, profit-oriented institutions competing with the traditional universities for the provision of higher education, creating a new scenario that challenges the more traditional assumptions of what a university should be. In Brazil and Chile, today, more than 70% of the higher education students are in private institutions, most of them for-profit. In Asia, Indonesia, Japan, Philippines and Korea have more than 70% of enrolled students in private institutions. The largest university in the US today, with almost 500 thousand students, is the for-profit University of Phoenix, owned by the Apollo Group, catering mostly to part-time students and making extensive use of face-to-face and on-line teaching methodologies.

Still newer is the establishment of multinational universities, of which the best example is probably Laureate Education Inc., which controls 45 accredited institutions in 20 countries (North America, Latin America, Europe, and Asia), with about 500 thousand students in undergraduate, master's and doctorate degree programs in a number of career fields including engineering, education, business, health care, hospitality, architecture, and information technology. United States, Japan, Australia, New Zealand and the European Union have been working for the liberalization of the trade of international education services in the context of the World Trade Organization and the General Agreement on Trades and Services (GATTS), generating a large and heated controversy on its potential benefits and dangers (Barblan 2002; Larsen and Vincent-Lancrin 2002; Robertson 2003; Sauvé 2002). To a large extent, it is an ideological debate of competing "discourses", placing on one side those who argue that liberalization would increase the opportunity to transfer knowledge and extend the educational opportunities throughout the world, against those that are afraid of what this could mean as a threat to local cultures and national self-determination.

The threats represented by private and international education for the institutions and culture of less developed, non-western societies are probably overstated in the ideological debates. They provide education opportunities for millions who would not have access to national, public institutions; the introduction of rational management practices, in a competitive market, can lead to better organized institutions, more responsive to the student's needs, and more attentive to the demands of the job market; and, in most cases, they try to adjust as much as possible to the local values and culture, to be able to compete with the public institutions. There are, however, problems related to equity in educational opportunities and to the need to preserve and strengthen academic institutions dedicated to long-term, scientific and cultural activities that would tend to disappear under strict short-term economic considerations. There is no assurance, however, that state-owned institutions, protected from market competition and international influences, would necessarily provide good quality, equitable and culturally relevant education. These problems have less to do with the legal nature of the institutions, and more with the way the public sector acts to regulate the higher education sector, public and private, creating mechanisms of quality assurance and allocating public resources for clearly stated goals of social equity, academic quality, academic freedom and social relevance.

The effects of privatization and internationalization are not restricted, however, to the second tier of new, mass-oriented higher education institutions, but impact also the main research universities throughout the world. There is also a clear trend of major universities in the United States and other countries to become "world class", global universities, which is reflected in the university rankings published by institutions such as the Times Higher Education and the Shanghai Jiao Tong University (Salmi 2009)

These rankings are clearly biased in favor of universities with high-prestige research achievements (i.g, Nobel Prizes) and reputation among the English speaking academic communities. It is obvious that not all institutions should or could try to become like Harvard or Cambridge, but there is a clear movement, in many countries, to select a few institutions to play the global role that high-ranking institutions are supposed to have. In Germany, for instance, as reported

in *Science*, “the federal government launched an ‘excellence initiative’ that would boost at least a few universities to world-class status - a German Ivy League” (Vogel 2006). China, Singapore and other Asian countries are also working hard to make their best universities to meet these new international standards (Altbach and Balán 2007).

Among the leading American universities, there is a clear drive to build upon their international prestige and become truly global universities, without, however, jeopardizing their more traditional academic core. Harvard University has a new Internet site, Harvard Worldwide, where it brings together the information of its global activities – worldwide research, worldwide curriculum, worldwide extracurricular activities. According to the site, 20% of the students in the University are from outside the United States, and its schools, and research centers have offices in 8 different countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, France, Greece, India, Japan. Columbia University is establishing a network of “global centers” scattered in different parts of the world – starting with Beijing and Amman, to be followed in 2010 by Paris, Mumbai and perhaps Africa. These centers are not being conceived as satellite campuses, but as legally independent and self-sustaining institutions, created in collaboration with local partners, which could provide support for Columbia university scholars doing research in these countries, extension activities, and eventually also for Columbia undergraduate students interested in getting an international experience.

Another example of this trend are the public policy schools and careers that emerged in the US in the 1960s, largely influenced by the writings of Harold Lasswell, in replacement of the more traditional course programs in public administration (Farr, Hacker, and Kazee 2006), and have today a very strong international component. Some outstanding examples are Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, Princeton’s Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs and Columbia’s School of International and Public Affairs. In Columbia, SIPA houses the universities’ several regional institutes and centers (of African, Brazilian, Iranian, East Central European, and Latin American studies, among others), and research centers such as the ones on International Conflict

Resolution, for the Study of Democracy and Toleration and Religion, for the Study of Human Rights, and others.

Clearly, the new managerial, global universities are more international than ever, but in a way that is very different from what they tried to do in the “golden years” of international cooperation some decades ago. They see the world as a market to be conquered, using their intellectual capital and prestige to establish partnerships with companies, governmental organizations, international agencies and non-governmental organization, and placing the more traditional modes of academic cooperation and interchange in a secondary place.

Changes in international cooperation: the search of alternatives

In the changing landscape of globalization, commercialization and stress on human rights, international organizations have tried to redirect their programs of international assistance. In 2005 the Netherlands Organization for International Cooperation in Higher Education (NUFFIC) organized a conference on “A Changing Landscape: Making support to tertiary education and research in developing countries more effective”, which brought together representatives of private and public institutions involved in international academic outreach, as well as of institutions in developing countries. In the summary document (Holtland and Boeren 2005), the authors list the usual challenges and concerns of higher education in developing countries (issues of access, massification, privatization, commoditization, quality assurance, relevance, digital divide, brain drain), the different types existing of international support, and a list of complaints about the way the aid is often provided: too few resources, lack of coordination, rigidity. The best kind of international support, for the document, is the one that takes place through institutional cooperation and joint projects between universities. It notes that Northern institutions, while well suited to provide support to Southern counterparts, “have fewer and fewer of their own resources available to do so. Core funding for research has been reduced over the last decade, available funds per student are under pressure and the culture of accountability means that much energy has to be devoted to management issues. Universities have to rely increasingly on external funding, both for research programs and for cooperation programs” (p. 8). The recommendations are

mostly related to increase partnerships and assure that the aid provided by donors is not wasted. It includes the need for quality assurance mechanisms, partnerships and networking, the creation and maintenance of Centers of Excellence, better donor coordination, increased levels of funding and flexibility. Finally, there is a list of challenges to be met: to make the links between support for higher education and poverty more explicit; creating a balance between quality and quantity; demonstrating the impact of support to higher education and research; resolving ownership issues at program and project level; and forging a shared vision of internationalization, development cooperation and knowledge production.

One could interpret this summary as an effort to improve on the traditional patterns of international cooperation that existed in the seventies, bringing new components such as accountability, the concerns with poverty and the need for a “shared vision” on internationalization, but without the original assumptions of the role of universities and the need for international cooperation. However, there is a clear contradiction between the dwindling resources for international cooperation and the new challenges and recommendations presented at the end. By reading some of the contributions to the conference, one can see that change in the cooperation landscape is much more profound than the summary paper may suggest.

One clear rupture with the past is in the replacement of the old goals of academic and international cooperation by human rights activism. The best example is the Ford Foundation, which, in the year 2000, created an ambitious International Fellowship Program with an endowment of 280 million dollars, the Foundations’ largest program ever (Dassin 2005). A 2009 publication gives an overview of the program’s rationale and achievements (Volkman, Dassin, and Zurbuchen 2009). In an introductory chapter, Dassin writes about the importance of higher education for social and economic development, and praises as “an important paradigm shift”, the more recent emphasis of the World Bank and Unesco on higher education and the needs of the knowledge society, instead of the exclusive emphasis on basic education in the 80s and 90s. There is now, however, an equity dimension which did not exist in the past. While recognizing that the

expansion of higher education in developing countries has increased social mobility, the text also notes that these benefits have been appropriated mostly by middle and upper sectors, and it has remained difficult for persons belonging to poor and deprived minorities to get the best benefits that higher education can provide. What the Ford Foundation program seeks to do, therefore, is to select promising candidates from these segments, and give them resources to work for advanced degrees in their own countries or abroad. A promising candidate should have the potential to perform well academically, and, at the same time, to be socially committed and willing to return to his community to help it to fight poverty and isolation.

There are no traces, in this program, of the old attempts by Rockefeller and Ford Foundation to build or strengthen specific universities or fields of knowledge, to build epistemic communities; instead, the drive is to build community bonds and social commitment. Many fellows do not have the necessary academic and language requirements to attend the most demanding universities, and one of the innovations of this program is involve the fellows in common activities and preparatory work.

The other radical rupture is related to the commercialization of higher education. In his contributing paper to the Nuffic Conference, Philip Altbach writes: “the market and commercial forces are increasingly dominant in international higher education. Commercialization serves needs on both sides. For the North, income producing higher education ventures produce much needed funds and may make up for enrollment shortfalls in the home market. For the South, access to higher education may be provided to students who otherwise could not gain entry to postsecondary institutions. New pedagogical or organizational ideas may be introduced, and partnerships among institutions may emerge. But they also impose foreign models and shift the locus of decision making abroad. The income produced by these initiatives mainly benefits the sponsoring institution in the North” (Altbach 2005). However, Altbach notes that many scholarship and exchange programs have few, if any commercial or direct political motivations, and concludes that “the public good must be at the center of all academic collaboration. There is a place, of course, for private institutions and for the

possibility of earning money as part of some international academic relationships, but the dominating principle must be the public good”; and that “Academic programs that link, on the basis of as much equality as possible, institutions in several countries and provide training and scholarship programs that enable students to study in more than one country, deserve consideration”.

These recommendations are clearly at the core of Sweden’s strategy of international academic cooperation. As noted in Swedish paper to the Nuffic Conference, “Sweden has been one of few donor countries that have acknowledged the need to strengthen research capacity at an institutional level, rather than granting training of individuals and research project support. Recently major actors in the donor community have rediscovered the significant role of science and technology for development” (Kjellqvist 2005). The paper recognizes the failures of past efforts to build good quality higher education institutions in developing countries, but expresses the belief that they could overcome if they were aligned with national policies and research strategies both at national and university levels. The problem, of course, is that most developing countries lack well-defined national policies and research strategies, and, when they do, they tend to be top-down, formal and bureaucratic, and with weak links at that actually take place at the level of institutions (Sutz 2000).

Epistemic communities, old and new

For both Levy and Coleman, in their assessments of the experiences of international cooperation with universities, the best outcome was the creation of a new generation of academics in different countries who shared a common set of ideas and values that, given appropriate conditions, could play important roles in the development of their societies and in linking them with the developed world. Thanks to international outreach, academic and research disciplines were established or strengthened and new networks were created, bringing together not only persons in third world universities but also researchers in the area studies centers and institutes in the United States and Europe, as well as experts in international organizations and private foundations who had learned to know, trust and cooperate with each other.

Positive expectations about the beneficial roles of networks of international experts are not new (Eide Galtung 1966). The notion that scientific knowledge is based on social communities, with values and motivations that transcend local limitations, has existed for many years (Merton 1973; Polanyi 1997), and have been empirically challenged and tested in recent years by the growing literature on the academic profession (Altbach and Finkelstein 1997; Altbach and Lewis 1996; Clark 1997; Enders 2005; Enders and Weert 2009; Musselin 2004).

A central assumption for the national and international investments in these scientific communities is the belief that science and science education are inherently good, and scientists and their institutions are a central and indispensable component in the processes of modernization the countries need. Scientists, of course, always like to promote this assumption, which justifies the support they get from society, and this was also the assumption behind the “development universities” fostered by the Rockefeller Foundation in the golden years.

One of the main casualties of the credibility crisis of international cooperation described above was the belief in the strategic importance of these epistemic communities of scientists and experts in national and international agencies, leading to the emergence of other epistemic communities and networks, as a new set of priorities emerged – human rights, equity, poverty, competitiveness, environment protection, globalization. In this process, the very notion of epistemic communities changed, to include not just scientists, professionals and academics, but many other actors, such as non-governmental organizations and social and political movements. The expression “epistemic communities” has been used recently in the international relations literature, in this expanded sense, to refer to networks of people and organizations that have been very active providing the basis for important global initiatives, from the old nuclear non-proliferating treaties to the current climate change movement (Adler and Haas 1992; Gough and Simon 2001; Haas 2002; Haas 1992). In their 2001 paper on the epistemic communities of climate change, Gough and Schackley show how non-governmental organizations participated in the networks that elaborated and prepared the main policy propositions for the Kyoto treaty. Working side by

side with established research institutions, the NGOs performed three important roles, developing creative policy solutions, coalition building and pressure or lobbying (Gough and Simon 2001 p 334). The positive roles of such coalitions of technical and non-technical actors are part of the more general formulation proposed by Haas and Adler on the role of epistemic communities in international affairs, transcending national and international organizations:

Epistemic communities play an evolutionary role as a source of policy innovations and a channel by which these innovations diffuse internationally. As most of the articles in this volume indicate, the policy ideas of epistemic communities generally evolve independently, rather than under the direct influence of government sources of authority. The impact of epistemic communities is institutionalized in the short term through the political insinuation of their members into the policymaking process and through their ability to acquire regulatory and policymaking responsibility and to persuade others of the correctness of their approach. In the longer term, the institutionalization of epistemic community influence occurs through socialization (...) (Adler and Haas 1992 p. 374)

The main criticism one could make to this formulation is that it is *post hoc*, based on a series of case studies of successful experiences, and does not give much consideration to situations in which the expansion of epistemic communities leads to disruption, as the case of the World Bank discussed above illustrates.

International cooperation and the social sciences: dependency theory and cultural criticism.

In their text on the Latin America area studies, Paul Drake and Lisa Hilbink mention “dependency theory” as one of the important theoretical contributions of Latin Americans to the social sciences, eagerly adopted by many US Latinamericanists in the 1970s and 1980s. US social scientists became aware of this theory through Cardoso and Faletto’s book on “Dependency and Development in Latin America”, published originally in 1969 in Spanish and with many later editions in English and other languages (Cardoso and Faletto 1979). The idea of interpreting the relations between countries through the notions of domination and exploitation that Marx has developed for the relations among classes, in fact, was not new, and can be linked back, among others, to V. I. Lenin’s book on

imperialism, to the French anthropologist Georges Balandier writings on the impact of colonization in Africa, to the theories of Raul Prebisch on the problems of economic development in third-world economies, and to the writings of Andrew Gunder Frank on underdevelopment (Balandier 1951; Frank 1967; Lenin 1937; Prebisch 1950). Cardoso and Faletto's book has been strongly revised and criticized both by supporters and opponents (Cardoso 1973; Cardoso and Font 2001; Frank 1978; Frank, Chew, and Denmark 1996; Furtado 1974; Henshel 1979; Kahl 1976; Packenham 1978; Packenham 1992), and Cardoso himself produced a thoughtful interpretation of the origins and impact of his book in the US (Cardoso 1977). More significant than the origins and conceptual validity of its propositions, perhaps, is the welcome it received among Latin American specialists in the US, where it provided the basis for opposition to the US foreign policy and a common language shared by these specialists and many of their colleagues in the South. Thanks to dependency theory, to be a Latinamericanist did not require anymore to endorse the US foreign policy, or its support to Latin American authoritarian regimes, or the war in Vietnam. Now, it meant to help Latin Americans in their nationalist and anti-imperialist struggles for economic development and national independence, and to be placed at the left of the US government in the ways to approach the issues of the Cold War.

Beyond dependency, a new, more radical ideological revision was taking place, less among social sociologists and political scientists in the South than among anthropologists and language specialists in the North, associated with the broad fields of post-modern literary critical theory and cultural studies. It would be impossible to attempt an overview of these trends, derived from the works of the Frankfurt School (Theodor W. Adorno, Walter Benjamin, Erich Fromm, Max Horkheimer, Herbert Marcuse) and French intellectuals (Jean Baudrillard, Gilles Deleuze, Jacques Derrida, Michael Foucault, Félix Guattari, Jean-François Lyotard) and their entrance in the North American academic circles since the 1960s. In Latin America, some of these ideas came out in *Prospero's Mirror*, a small book by Richard M. Morse, a US historian and Latin Americanist who had written some well-known books on urban history and the city of São Paulo, and worked as a consultant for the Ford Foundation in 1958–64 and again in Rio de

Janeiro in 1973–75 (Needell 2001). In this book, published in Portuguese and Spanish, (Morse 1982; Morse 1988),

Morse proposed a radical revision of the history and interpretation of Latin American culture and civilization. It is possible to trace the core of Morse's ideas to those of his mentor, Louis Hartz, who had tried to explain the failures of American liberalism for its lack of a feudal past (Hartz 1955), and, more broadly, to the romantic, irrationalist thinking that prevailed in the German academic circles in the years after World War (Ringer 1990). Fascinated with the Western developed countries, Morse argued, the Latin Americans do not perceive that liberalism, representative democracy, rationalism, scientific empiricism, pragmatism, all these ideals propagated by the rich countries in the North are not only incompatible with the deeper roots of Iberian America, but also manifestations of the decay and lack of meaning of the very capitalist bourgeois society that created these ideas (Morse 1989; Schwartzman 1997).⁷ However, if Latin Americans looked at their own roots, they could find a much more significant tradition, which could help them to transcend the individualism and lack of meaning of their attempts to mimic the Western societies. These roots had two parts. One was the civilizational project of the Spanish conquerors, which had successfully brought together State and Church and had, therefore, a strong moral and ethical component that provided an external and firm point of reference for the individuals. The second was some kind of native sense of communal identity and participation derived from the pre-Colombian civilizations, which emerged in some episodes of popular insurrections and were captured in the writings of authors such as the Peruvian José Carlos Mariátegui. The problem with Latin America was that its leaders forgot these authentic roots and tried, vainly, to copy the model of the modern, liberal and decadent societies of Western Europe and the United States.

From these premises, Morse derived a devastating attack on all the attempts to build Western-type universities and academic research in Latin America, which

⁷ What follows is a summary of two articles I wrote criticizing Morse's book, published initially in Estudos CEBRAP and republished in Schwartzman 1977. See also Morse's (Morse 1989).

have engaged so many Latin Americans and cooperation entities such as the Ford Foundation in previous years. His strongest criticism goes to the bogus intellectuals in the South that attempt to monkey the decadent universities of the North, and to develop, through academic professionalization, a better knowledge of their societies. The condemnation of the Latin American social scientists – their institutions, their research, their data, their methods of empirical research, their academic congresses, their journals – was not just because of their inability to make proper copies of the Northern models, but of the inadequacy of the very models they were trying to copy. Only through the literature, on one extreme, and through social movements that could resurrect the unconscious roots the authentic Latin American civilization, on the other, would it be possible to understand the meaning and find a sense of direction for the region.

Very few, if any, of the officers in the main international cooperation foundations and agencies endorsed or even understood the full implications of Morse's ideas. Still, in the seventies, Morse's ideas helped to put an end to the golden years of attempts to export progress to the third world, paving the way to other approaches and trends.

From economic development to human rights

The tumultuous transition from economic development to poverty reduction and human rights in the agenda of international outreach had profound effects not only in agencies such as the World Bank, but also in the universities involved in cooperation activities in the United States and other parts of the world, as well as in the epistemic communities that give them support.

One of the oldest human rights academic units in the United States is Columbia University's Center for the Study in Human Rights, established in 1978. Like most similar centers created afterwards, it is not a department or institute, but a coordinating center that promotes events, publishes documents, offers a summer course and a combination of undergraduate and graduate degrees through the universities' different colleges. One of its flagships is the Human Rights Advocacy Program (HRAP), through which a number of human rights activists from different parts of the developing world come to the university. For the year 2009, the program had lawyers coming from Uganda, Afghanistan, Georgia, Thailand,

Kyrgyzstan, Kenya, Nepal, Mexico and the United States, most of them associated with non-governmental organizations and think tanks.

At Harvard, human rights programs started later, with the Carr Center for Human Rights Policies at the Kennedy School of Government, established in 1999, the Human Rights Program at Harvard Law School (1985), the Harvard Humanitarian Initiative (2005) and the François-Xavier Bagnoud Center for Health and Human Rights (2008), all loosely coordinated by a University-wide Harvard University Committee on Human Rights Studies. As in Columbia, undergraduate and graduate education is provided through the academic departments, and the Committee and associate centers organize seminars, provide fellowships and opportunities for students to go abroad, and have also a small program of fellowships to support academics at risk of political harassment in different parts of the world.

Similar developments occurred in other universities, and an incomplete list includes the Lowenstein Human Rights Project at Yale's Law School (1981), the Human Rights Center at the University of California, Berkeley (1994), the International Human Rights Law Program at UCLA, the Center for Human Rights and Global Justice at the New York University School of Law, the Human Rights program at the University of Chicago, the Center for Civic and Human Rights at the University of Notre Dame Law School, and so forth. These new initiatives did not replace the old centers and institutes of area studies, that, however, had their relevance diminished; they either had to change their priorities, bringing the human rights issues to their core, as it happened with Harvard's David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies, or to become more involved in foreign languages and literature, making use of the support provided by the US Department of Education through the National Resource Centers Program for Foreign Language and Area Studies.

Compared with the traditional regional and area studies program, an obvious difference is the preeminence of law schools and law specialists in most of the human rights initiatives, instead of economists, political scientists and sociologists. Another important difference is that the main partners and beneficiaries of international work and cooperation are no longer universities,

researchers and education authorities in developing countries, but non-governmental organizations and activists.

With the known limitations, the cooperation activities carried on in the past helped to establish modern social sciences and economics in different parts of the world, and social scientists from other countries also helped to shape the work of American regional experts, as exemplified by the impact of dependency theory in the US. Economics, political science, sociology and anthropology, in spite of the local biases of their different schools and research traditions, aspire to be universal, and have led to strong traditions of international comparative studies. In contrast, a review made recently of fifty years of efforts to build comparative law as an academic endeavor in the US has shown no significant results. According to the reviewer, “while comparative law has been a considerable success in terms of producing a wealth of knowledge, it has been a resounding failure with regard to its more general development as a field of inquiry: it has failed to mature into an up-to-date, well-defined, and coherent discipline. Comparative law has rarely shown itself capable of generating broad and deep insight of general interest, e.g., into the structure and development of legal systems or into the relationship between law, society, and culture on a regional or worldwide basis. As a result, it does not have the intellectual prominence nor enjoy the academic recognition one would expect in our international age. In some quarters, especially in the United States, this has led to an identity crisis, triggering much soul-searching as well as attempts to find new directions” (Reimann 2002 p 685).

It is interesting that, in this detailed and erudite review of comparative law, there is no reference to human rights. A possible explanation is that, although the field of human rights, in practice, has been dominated by lawyers, it has been mostly as a discourse developed to protect the individual rights against the harassment of governments or groups (Freeman and Ert 2005), less than a theoretical concern or a research topic. Efforts to establish the normative principles of human rights have come mostly from political theory, philosophy and economics, as in the works of John Rawls and Amartya Sen (Rawls 1972; Sen and Foster 1973 (1997)). Between the general principles of justice on one side, and the legal

defense of individual rights on the other, lies a very complex set of systemic and historical explanations for the development of different human rights regimes or their violations which are preferred subject of political scientists (Landman 2005). However, there is a clear trend, mostly among the young generation of social scientists, to conceive social research as basically an effort to measure the extent to which human rights are being violated or upheld in different societies, and issue the corresponding moral verdicts on the outcomes. This trend has been favored by the emergence of a series of indexes of human development, corruption, freedom and other rights published periodically by international organizations, such as the UNPD Human Development Report and the Corruption Perception Index of Transparency International.

The replacement of social scientists by lawyers and activists, and of social analysis and interpretation by rankings and moral condemnation, have had some unexpected consequences, one of them being the incorporation of the post-modern, anti-scientific and anti-Western perspectives in the human rights movement. The other, paradoxically, was that the intensification of Western biases, opening the human rights movement to criticism from those resisting the implementation of its core values.

It is possible to see the first consequence by following the tendency of many human rights movements to favor direct participation over representative democracy, traditional cultures of indigenous populations over Western culture and education, small-scale economy over large-scale industry and agribusiness, and even traditional over Western-type medicine. These are difficult issues, which cannot be solved by an either-or approach.

One example is the situation of the policies regarding the indigenous populations in Latin America. There is a long and black history of genocide and neglect of the native populations in the region, dating back from centuries of colonization and extending in many places to the present day. In some countries, the indigenous population was wiped out long ago, or remained isolated in far-off regions, living in poverty and decimated by disease. In other countries like Ecuador, Bolivia, Guatemala, Paraguay and Peru, most or a large part of the population is indigenous, speak its own languages, but is to a large extent excluded from the

benefits of modern society and the modern economy. As one author notes, “electoral democracy dominates the hemisphere, yet theorist of democracy must note that access alone fails to provide adequate rights to marginalized Indian majorities or sufficient protection to distinct ethnic minorities. Beyond regime type or institutional configuration, it is the relationship between state and civil society - the terms of citizenship - that has become the critical component of consolidating and deepening democracy. At the normative level, indigenous peoples remind us that social and cultural rights interact with institutional guarantees and that truly universal citizenship is plurinational” (Brysk 2000 p. 285). This text brings together a classic topic in political science, the limitations of formal democracy, and a new and contentious statement about the recognition and separate rights of nationalities within the modern nation-states. It seems obvious that different ethnic groups in a state should have the right to speak and learn their own language, to benefit from policies to help them to overcome past discriminations, and keep their own local cultural and even legal institutions. At the same time, the author himself warns against the risk of turning this concern for pluralism and affirmative policies into identity politics: “identity politics empowers victims of oppression and politicizes cultural domination and ideological hegemony. Identity politics can also enshrine victimization, obsess over discourse, impede alliances, and impose a totalizing counter-hegemony” (p. 298-9).

A good example of this situation is Bolivia, where Evo Morales, of Indian ancestry, presents himself and is supported by many as a representative of the native population, and uses this support to weaken the country’s established political institutions and strengthen his own personal power, in alliance with the “Bolivarian” revolution of Hugo Chavez in Venezuela. Another example is the effort of local and multinational NGOs to introduce legal racial classifications in Brazil, as the basis for affirmative action programs in support of the descendants of African slaves of the 19th and earlier centuries. In all these cases the reality is immensely more complex. Morales is a very modern leader of coca growers; the Bolivian Indians have been organized in strong trade unions and political associations for many decades (Klein 1982); and most Brazilians are of mixed

blood, and do not see their main identity as race-based (Fry and Maggie 2007; Schwartzman 2007; Schwartzman 1999).

Still, it is true that the indigenous populations in Bolivia and the descendants of African slaves in Brazil are worse off than the whites of recent or not so recent European origin. The tragedy of the racial and cultural conflicts that became endemic after the Cold War is that it is too easy to pass from the careful and undeniable statements about the need to improve the existing democratic regimes and their social and economic policies to the politics of identity, which tends to simplify all situations in terms of black and white, good and bad, and end up providing comfort and support to Chavez, Morales, Daniel Ortega, Rafael Correa and other Latin American populists of the 21st century. This tendency to simplify and to embark in the politics of identity is not just a mistake, but follows from the way the human right movements operate, making extensive use of the mass media, and translating conflicts of interest into moral issues (Ignatieff, Appiah, and Gutmann 2001)

Another problematic effect of the recent prevalence of human rights is its impact on the ways public policies are implemented when they are converted into domestic practices (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 2000). When public bureaucracies are inefficient and corrupt, and the political process is subject to the influence of big money and the manipulation of public opinion through the mass media, there is a strong temptation to replace established institutions with voluntary action. There are many examples of this, like the efforts to provide education through social movements, rather than through regular schools, or to replace the usual procedures for budget allocation by some kind of participatory budgeting process. However, social policies based on the ability of specific groups to mobilize for their interests and motivations risk to leave aside the interests and needs of those less able to get organized, or to give too much power and authority to non-governmental organization that proclaim to speak on behalf of the powerless. By turning the attention and energy of society away from and against the established institutions, human rights activism can weaken them still further, and make them less able to fulfill their

roles, than if they were under the pressure and oversight of social movements and public opinion.

One important consequence of the human rights approach to policy-making is the emphasis on general rights and their enforcement through court procedures, rather than the reliance on the technical work of the public administration. Brazil is a good example. The 1988 Constitution, written after 20 years of military autocracy, has a very detailed list of individual rights and the obligations of authorities to fulfill them, without any consideration for priorities or the means necessary to implement them. One consequence, in the area of public health has been the myriad of individual decisions taken by local judges ordering the health authorities to provide expensive medical treatments which are not part of the established health administration procedures, draining the resources needed for general care. These decisions are based on the constitutional principle that all persons are entitled to free health care, and the prevalence, among judges, of the view that it is their role to uphold the individual rights, without consideration of broader financial or administrative public constraints.

Conclusions

It is difficult to summarize, in a few paragraphs, the main conclusions one could draw from this short narrative of international cooperation and its impact of the social sciences and international higher education. It is possible to say that, in spite of the tendencies for globalization and privatization, higher education will continue to grow and to thrive, and universities will continue to expand their role as knowledge centers and innovation drivers, in ways, however, that are very different from what they used to be in the past. They will have to compete with other public and private research institutions in the leadership for knowledge production, and with other providers for the delivery of professional, general and vocational education. They will broaden their reach, getting ever more involved in international activities and networks, without, however, losing their strong national identities, even in a context such as the European Union, in spite of all its efforts at academic integration (Musselin 2004). To play their roles, they will continue to rely on extensive professional and scientific communities,

which are also nationally based, but much more internationalized than the institutions in which they work.

These trends are valid both for developed and developing countries, but it is not certain that all developing and transition countries will be able to build and maintain viable and relevant higher education institutions – this will depend, in part, on the contributions of international cooperation, but ultimately, on the country's own ability, and that of their professional and academic communities, to sustain and care about their academic and educational institutions.

The new actors, and some of the old ones in new robes, have their agendas shaped by social movements which are relevant to their own societies, and work to press their views and perspectives on other countries, in issues like human rights, poverty, population control, racial and gender equality, environment protection and grass-roots political participation. Most of these issues are universal today, and organizations such as International Amnesty and Greenpeace play important roles in making them more central to anyone's agenda. But the promoters of the new forms of cooperation do not know, and do not care much anymore, about long-term issues like institution building, scientific and technological development, educational reform and many others of the previous years.

In both cases traditional scientific communities are bypassed. Among policy makers, inspired in the "Asian miracle", the old linear model of science production and diffusion, from basic to applied, is now being replaced by a "reverse linear" perspective, which assumes research and higher education to be a byproduct of industrial modernization. For the militants on both sides, academics are at best irrelevant to their societies, and at worse users of scarce resources, and an obstacle to the empowerment of the dispossessed.

What does this mean for the social sciences? To some extent, there is nothing really new in this situation. From its inception, social sciences developed in close association with policy making, and it is possible to show that both the development of the welfare state and of modern social sciences are part of the same broad historical process (Brooks, Gagnon, Conway, Hall, Lindquist, Pal, Weiss, Wagner, and Wittrock 1990; Wagner, Wittrock, and Whitley 1991;

Wittrock and Elzinga 1985). However, not all engaged, applied social science is good science. For the social sciences to develop, it needs the special institutional setting that fosters intellectual independence, organized skepticism, universalism, disinterestedness, and communalism – the classic norms of scientific communities identified by Robert K. Merton that are found in the best academic institutions, which are also a creation of the modern welfare state. The fact that these norms do not exist in isolation does not mean that they are irrelevant. From this perspective, it is worth considering whether the more recent changes in higher education institutions and the way they engage in international cooperation and outreach is doing more harm than good to the kind of knowledge they develop and disseminate.

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